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competence and integrity in the student, and obligations to the patient. Pellegrino's suggestions are not without their limitations, but he succeeds in identifying
several problems, stating the issues within each problem, and making reasonable
suggestions to resolve them . He also succeeds in putting his finger on many of the
problems that need serious debate within medical schools.
These essays are not to be read quickly. Each has something to say, and it is
worth considering. The book deserves a wide reading among physicians in private
practice and especially by those physicians and other individuals who are involved
in medical education.
- Thomas A. Shannon
Associate Professor of Medical Ethics, Department of Psychiatry
University of Massachusetts Medical Cente"r

The Ethics

0/ Homicide

Philip K Devine
Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts PI., Ithaca, N.Y. 14850. 1978, 247 pp.,
$12.95.
Among other things, this book gives a survey of recent views in secular philosophy on abortion, euthanasia, rights of animals (and plants), and rights of
persons. After reading this survey, a Catholic with a decent upbringing can only
come away with the overwhelming impression that the chief characteristic of
modern secular ethics is its utter moral bankruptcy. (This judgment does not
apply to Devine himself who tries to stand apart from the general trend.)
What else can we conclude when a philosopher of obvious good-will must twist
and turn through several pages (46-106) to prove that a human person deserves
more respect than a cabbage? (Devine reports, and tries to refute, the arguments
of philosophers who hold that rights are based on "interests" and since plants as
well as humans have "interests," then the statuses of plants and humans are
basically the same [pp. 48-49].) What else can we conclude when a philosopher of
good-will feels required to treat with respect (although disagreement) the ethical
condoning of infanticide (pp. 64-69)? And what finally can we conclude, except that
modern secular ethics is corrupt, when a large number of philosophers will condone any act, from judicial murder to geronticide and genocide, if it appears that
it will produce the best results in the long run?
A case in point of the gymnastics some philosophers will perform to keep their
desired conclusions is Michael Tooley. Philosophers had shown that if you deny
fetuses (unborn babies) the right to life, then, logically, you must also deny
infants the right to life. Whereupon, Tooley concluded that infanticide must be
permissible, arguing that a being has rights only if it is self-conscious and has
desires that can be frustrated. It was then pointed out that both common sense
and the law attribute rights to infants, such as not to be mutilated, or not to be
robbed of an inheritance. Tooley replied that such rights are based on the fact
that the infant will, in the future, come to desire that the violation (e.g., mutila-

370

Linacre Quarterly

tion) had not occurred, but this did not mean that infants have a right to life ,
since if the infant is killed no future desire would be frustrated, the future desires
being killed along with the infant. I call these gymnastics. Devin e points out that
according to Tooley 's argument, if you injure an infant you had better finish th e
job and kill him. It seems that Tooley will accept any conclusion, however absurd,
as long as abortion remains permitted.
In chapter 1 Dev ine argues that homicide is prima faci e wrong, not because of
its overall consequences (against "pure" consequentialists) but because of the
harm done to the person kill e d . Personal human life is valuable in itself and must
not be destroyed unless there are stringent justifications. Further, what is valuable
is personal human life itself, and not simply a certain "quality " of life .
In two important chapters (2 and 3), Devine considers the question: What is
the dividing line bet wen two persons with a right to life, and nonpersons? He
rejects what he calls the "present e njoyment principle," which says that only
those who are in "prese nt possession of distinctively human traits" are persons.
This is the principl e abortionists invoke , arguing that fetuses or embryos are not
persons since they do not "socialize," reason, etc. Devine points out that on this
principle not only fetuses but also infants a nd the reversibly comatose (indeed, all
of us. during a good' night's sleep) would not be persen& Thus- abortion , infanticide, and killing the reversibly comatose are logically in the same boat. Devine
does not prove that all of these acts are wrong. Rather, he relies on our intuitions
to know that infanticid e is wrong and infers from that to the defectiveness of the
"present e njoyment principle."
Devine takes the position that a person is a being who has a capacity for
consciousness, meaningful communication, etc. Since both fetuses and infants will
d evelop , if nothing goes wrong, into conscious and speaking human beings, it
follows that they, like unconscious adults, are human persons.
However, he denies that the irreversibly comatose, or the severely mentally
retarded who never develop speech, have a capacity for specifically human acts.
These creatures h e calls humans, but not persons. He thus condones abortion for
certain "fetal indications" (e.g., Tay-Sachs disease but not mongolism) and the
killing of the irreversibly comatose.
Likewise, he holds that the embryo is not a person at least until after twinning
becomes impossibl e, since individuation is an essential component of p ersonhood.
Thus he seems also to condone early abortions. (In bri ef criticism of Devine at this
point: the possibility of twinning does not show lack of individuation in the
embryo, since twinning could be a process like parthenogenesis; that is, twinning
might simply be the production of a new individual from a cell of the first, and
continually ex isting, individual. He nce we have no warrant not to treat the
embryo from fertilization onward as a human person.)
Devine argues for a 'k ind of "mixed" consequential ism. That is , h e rejects the
justification of killing simply on the grounds that "it offers the best results on the
whole" (p. 138). He argues that "there seems no stable way of walling off this
kind of justification and blocking its extension to cases where it is clearly
unacceptable" (p. 150). Hence he restricts justifications of homicide to two
forms: 1) cases of "extreme n ecessity," and 2) defense of oneself or others against
an "aggressor."
By the principl e of "extreme necessity" he und erstands that "if the dec edent
(i.e., victim) loses nothing by being killed (being certainly doomed to die very
shortly in any case) and others who would die otherwise will be saved by his being
killed, then killing is justified" (p . 145). On this principle Dev ine justifies abortion
in the (rare)cases where otherwise both mother and baby would die , as well as
many other types 'df dire'c t killing.
In the principl e of defense of self and others, he understands "aggressor" in a
causal sense rather than a moral or juridical one. Thus Devine considers an
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"aggressor" an unborn baby whose li fe t hrea tens its mother's life, and so on this
principle he justifies abortion to save the life of the moth er , even if otherwise the
baby would live. He considers war direct killing, bu t justifies it by this principle
also.
"Extreme necessi ty " and defense against "aggressors" are t he only justifica'
tions Devine allows. Hence "mercy killing," whether voluntary or invo luntary , is
rejected. Whether suicide is morall y permiss ible he leaves undecided in this book
but h e insists that suicides mu st n ot be assiste d .
'
Thus Devine's conclusions mi ght be called "moderate" in relation to secular
ethics in ge neral: h e rejects abortion o n demand , euthanasia , killing simply for
utilitarian reasons; but h e con do nes som e early abort ions, abortions to save the
m other's life, abortions for certain "fetal indica tions," killing the irreversibly
comatose, and direct killing in a host of other cases describabl e as defe nse o f self
or others.
I select two areas for basic criticism : his criterion of personhood, and his
"mixed" consequential ism :
a) D evi ne rightly explains that moral rights - the right of a perso n to be treated
as a n end in himself and not a m ere m eans, among others - are based on a
capacity to reason, choose, etc. But h e fa ils to explain why this is so . Rights are
base d on the capacity to reason and choose, not simply becau se such b eings are
capable of "a specially rich kind of life" (p. 95). Simply, "a richer kind of life "
denotes a di ffere nce in degree not in kind , a nd what is nee ded to justify the qual·
itatively differen t kind o f respect we pay to human persons, as opposed, say, to
cabbages or cats, is a quali tative difference in their beings. Briefly, the capacity to
reason and choose is such a qualitative diffe re nce, because that capacity m eans
that such a be ing determin es himself rather than being a mere passive subject to
outside forces. A b eing endowe d with the capacity to reason and choose is a
center of activity, a n original sou rce of value, whereas plants and brute animals are
not unique, being distinctive or individu al o nl y through external influences. (This
does not m ean t h at plants and b rute an imals should always be regarded as m ere
tools for m an 's use; they a lso deserve respect, n ot as ends in themselves, which
t hey are not, bu t as creatures manifesting the glory of God.)
D evin e condones the killing of t h e seve rely retarded (those unab le ever to
speak) and t h e killing of the irreversibl y comatose, because h e holds that they lack
the capacity to speak , reason, et c., and are t h erefore nonpersons althou gh human .
Bu t t he capacity to reason an d choose b e longs to man's nature, so that every
huma n be ing h as that cap ac ity. Th e fact t h at som e human s will never, in t his life,
actualize t h at capacity does not evi dence a lack of it; it sh o ws only that an
impedi m ent - insufficient brain development, for exam pl e - prevents the ac tu ali·
zation of that capacity, just as a man sti ll h as the in trinsic capac ity to m ove his
arms even if, tied to a tree, he is prevented from actual izing his capac ity. Hence
every human being is a person and every innocent hum an being h as a right to life.
b) The central part of Devine's book is his explanat ion of why homi cid e is
prima facie wrong (only prima facie since he a ll ows justifications). It is wrong, he
says, not merely because of consequences in the long run , but, centrall y, because
of the harm done to the one killed (p. 18). At first sight t his sounds lik e co mmon
sense. Bu t note that in t his claim Devine m akes the primary source of moral evil
wholly extrinsic to t h e will or t h e will's in trinsic direction . From this premise, th e
conclusions in the rest of the book fo llo w: 1) if the victim would die shortl y
anyway, we may kill him , since our act wou ld not increase the amou nt of
(external) harm that will at any rate occur; 2) the admitted harm to the victim can
be offset by (see mingly) greater harm that could happen to oth ers if we did not
kill him. That is, if the original harm effected in homicide is external to t he will ,
then other external harms will not be qualitatively"distinct fro m the original h arm ,
an d thus could quantitatively outweigh it.
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According to the Catholic tradition, on the contrary, the source of moral evil is
precisely the intrinsic direction of the will. A Christian knows that adultery is
committed in the heart even if nothing external has a hair 's chance of occurring,
and that blasphemy is wrong even though there is, and can be , no direct external
effect. That is to say, moral evil consists primarily in the will 's repudiation of a
basic good or value. Thus in the (rare) abortion case , for example, where the
choice is between directly killing one or letting both die, we are obliged not to
kill, because the external results are of a different order from that of the interior
act of will directed against an innocent human life. The interior act of will constitutes a person's deciding for or against the objective order of goodness or value
established by God Himself. Direct killing can be justified only as defense of self
or others against unjust aggressors . Only purposeful aggression makes a person not
innocent and thus deprived of the right not to be killed directly. If someone's life
endangers the safety of others, through no purposeful act of his own, e.g., because
he is diseased or because a foreign country threatens to kill hostages if he is not
killed, such a person still cannot be justly killed . Innocent human life (innocent in
the sense just explained, and not in a mere causal sense) is inviolable.
- Patrick Lee , Ph.D.
St. Francis de Sales ColIege

Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology
Charles E. Curran
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind. , 1979. $11.95 (hard cover),
$4. 95 (soft cover).
People may disagree with Father Charles Curran's approach to Catholic moral
theology. They may even argue, as he admits, that he has incorporated so much
transition into his moral thinking that he has abandoned the Catholic tradition.
But everyone knows where he stands. His new volume , Transition and Tradition in
Moral Th eology, once more records his opinions cl early, forthrightly, and
persuasively , for whatever they may be worth.
In this volume he has skillfully joined nine separate essays prepared for various
occasions into one volume, with admirable continuity and consistency. The nine
essays fall neatly into three parts with three chapters each.
Part one co nsiders general moral theology with an overview chapter and
separate chapters on contraception and homosex uality . He maintains an even and
calm style broken by occasional sweeping statements.
As examples of the latter, co nsider these three bold and au thoritative
statements:
"There can be no doubt in the light of the histor ical circumstanc es that the
official imposition of Thomism was an attempt to prevent any dialogue with the
contemporary world and its thought patterns" (p. 12).
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